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Trademark dilution, despite its significance as a cause of action
in trademark law, has not been as heavily analyzed by scholars within
the field of linguistics and law as one might expect. This article
reviews contributions that linguists have made to trademark law and
suggests that established linguistic methodologies might assist legal
practitioners in formulating causes of actions based on trademark
dilution.
t Ronald R. Butters recently retired as Professor of English and Cultural Anthropology
and chair of the Linguistics Program at Duke University, where he began teaching in 1967. His
linguistic interests with respect to the law include: (1) statutes and contracts, (2) death-penalty
appeals, and (3) semiotic and other linguistic issues in trademark litigation. He is currently vice
president of the International Association of Forensic Linguists and one of the coeditors of the
Association's journal, The International Journal of Speech, Language and the Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Trademark dilution is a topic that has rarely been engaged within
the specialized field of linguistics and law,1 even by those scholars
who regularly consult with law firms on trademark issues and on
occasion testify as expert witnesses in trademark litigation.2 "Forensic
linguists" have long been accepted as legitimate social-science expert
witnesses on such trademark matters as strength of mark and
likelihood of confusion, 3 but very rarely have they opined directly on
dilution issues. This essay (1) reviews the types of contributions that
linguists have commonly made with respect to trademarks (including
a look at two cases in which the testimony of linguists may have had
some effect on the determination of dilution); and (2) presents some
suggestions about how established methodologies of linguistics might
be of service to legal professionals in construing dilution in theory
and practice.
1. The scholarly organizations most centrally concerned with the field of Language and
Law are the International Association of Forensic Linguists and the International Association for
Forensic Phonetics and Acoustics, which jointly publish a scholarly journal devoted to the field,
The International Journal of Speech, Language, and the Law. Another international scholarly
group, The Law and Society Association, regularly offers sections on language-and-law topics
at its annual meetings. In North America, papers in the field are presented at meetings of-and
published in the scholarly journals of-the American Dialect Society, the American Name
Society, The Dictionary Society of North America, and the Linguistic Society of America.
2. See Roger W. Shuy, Linguistic Thoughts on Trademark Dilution (Jan. 2004)
(unpublished manuscript of a conference presentation, on file with author); Roger W. Shuy,
Linguistics and Trademark Dilution, TRADEMARK DILUTION F. 2003, available at
http://www.rogershuy.com/download.php?file=RWS-article trademark dilution.pdf; Barton
Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2004) (discussing
dilution within a broad linguistic framework).
3. Raven 1. McDavid, Jr., Evidence, in PAPERS IN LANGUAGE VARIATION: SAMLA-
ADS COLLECTION 125 (David L. Shore & Carole P. Hines eds., 1977) (discussing one such
apparent likelihood-of-confusion case against Jay's Potato Chips of Chicago on behalf of Frito-
Lay of Atlanta and Dallas in which the author had served as an expert linguistic consultant); E.
Air Lines, Inc. v. N. Y. Air Lines, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ( a case in which the
linguist Allen Walker Read and the lexicographer Jesse Stein took opposite sides in giving
testimony with respect to the alleged genericness of the mark Air Shuttle used to designate a
type of airplane service); Richard Bailey, Dictionaries and Proprietary Names: The Air-Shuttle
Case, 6 DICTIONARIES 53 (1984) (publication of the experts' reports from E Air Lines).
Concerning more recent cases, see the works listed infra at note 4; see also Janet E. Ainsworth,
Linguistics as a Knowledge Domain in the Law, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 651, 662-63, 669 (2006);
Blake Stephen Howald, Comment, Comparative and Non-Comparative Forensic Linguistic
Analysis Techniques: Methodologies for Negotiating the Interface of Linguistics and
Evidentiary Jurisprudence in the American Judiciary, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 285, 288-289
n. 14 (2006).
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II. TRADEMARK DILUTION AND LINGUISTIC MEASURES OF
"FAME"
Apart from the specialized field of linguistics and law,
conceptualizing trademarks as linguistic objects has been almost
entirely in the service of the linguistic subspecialty known as
lexicography or dictionary making.4 Because trademarks are in most
respects full-fledged words in the language, lexicographers have
needed to be able to define such terms as trademark, service mark,
and brand name not only as dictionary entries but also as terms of art
within the field itself.
Furthermore, dictionary makers have needed to develop concepts
akin to the legal notion, important to dilution issues, of trademark
fame. Even unabridged dictionaries cannot possibly list and define all
of the words that speakers of English use-let alone all of the
trademarks. Thus dictionary makers have had to find some principled
means for ranking words according to their lexicographical
importance-so as to be able to exclude some and include others. The
criteria that have evolved require something of a lexicographical
balancing act: (a) special consideration is given to relatively arcane
terms that the general user of a dictionary might nonetheless have
occasion to look up (for example, brand names for pharmaceuticals);
yet (b) terms must also be included that are so frequent in occurrence
and central to the ordinary speaker's knowledge of the language that
they belong in every dictionary as a matter of record-what to the
lexicographer are, in effect, "famous" words.
4. Outside the field of lexicography, the most in-depth overview of linguistic work on
trademarks is ROGER W. SHUY, LINGUISTIC BATTLES IN TRADEMARK DISPUTES (2002)
[hereinafter SHUY, LINGUISTIC BATTLES]. See also Michael Adams, Lexical Property Rights:
Trademarks and American Dictionaries, VERBATIM, winter 2005, at 1; Michael Adams &
Jennifer Westerhaus Adams, Surnames and American Trademark Law, 53 NAMES 259 (2005);
Dennis Baron, Word Law, VERBATIM, Summer, 1989, at 1; Ronald R. Butters, Changing
Linguistic Issues in US Trademark Litigation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND EUROPEAN
IAFL CONFERENCE ON FORENSIC LINGUISTICS/LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 29 (M. Teresa Turell
et al. eds., 2007); Ronald Butters, Sociolinguistic Variation and the Law, in SOCIOLINGUISTIC
VARIATION: THEORIES, METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS 318 (Robert Bayley & Ceil Lucas eds.,
2007); Ronald R. Butters, Trademarks and Other Proprietary Terms, in DIMENSIONS OF
FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 318 (John Gibbons & M. Teresa Turell eds., forthcoming) (manuscript
on file with author); Ronald R. Butters & Jennifer Westerhaus, Linguistic Change in Words One
Owns: How Trademarks Become "Generic, " in STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 11 I11 (Anne Curzan & Kim Emmons eds., 2004); SHAWN M. CLANKIE, A THEORY
OF GENERICIZATION ON BRAND NAME CHANGE (2002); Genine Lentine & Roger W. Shuy, Mc-:
Meaning in the Marketplace, 65 AM. SPEECH 349 (1990) (describing Shuy's testimony in
Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 215-16 (D. Md. 1988)).
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Thus the notion of the relative fame of a trademark, so important
to determination of the legal potential for dilution, intersects with the
lexicographical necessity for taking into account the degree to which
a word might be considered well known. Within the legal framework,
such evaluation cannot of course be a simple matter of (a) declaring a
trademark "famous" that appears in standard dictionaries and (b)
giving an automatic lesser status to trademarks that do not appear
therein-if for no other reason than that standard dictionaries find
room for very few trademarks at all. For example, The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language has over 70,000 entries,
only about 300 of which are defined as active trademarks. 5 Moreover,
of the listed live trademarks, a number appear to be relatively
obscure-the kind of words that are listed because the dictionary
maker may well have concluded that the general public will not be
familiar with them (for example, Pentothol, Butazoladin, Lastex,
Mauser, Bondo).6 Others appear intuitively to be so famous that
portions of the public may need to be instructed that they are
trademarks and not generic terms (for example, Band-Aid, Frisbee,
Mace, Kleenex, Xerox).7 Still others that one might well expect to be
in a list of "famous" marks are not entered in American Heritage
(e.g., Microsoft, Burger King, Apple; some of these, such as American
Airlines, may be omitted because they are so transparent in
meaning).8
Dictionary making is an empirical science, based upon data
collected from the actual use of the language by ordinary speakers
and writers. Lexicographical methodology in large part involves the
surveying of large samples of printed material from which definitions
are inductively constructed. In principle, therefore, a linguist could
readily construct, using the normal procedures of lexicography, an
evaluation metric that would help a trier of fact to evaluate the degree
of fame of a particular mark. As has been noted above, sheer quantity
of occurrence already is one of the metrics that must be used when
lexicographers do their word-exclusion tasks. Adapting the extant
5. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000).
6. Id. at 1302, 253, 989, 1082, 209.
7. Id. at 139, 705, 1047, 968, 1989.
8. Transparent is a term of art in linguistic semantics, used to describe words whose
meaning is fully determined by the meaning of the component parts. For example, dog food
'food for a dog' is more transparent than comfort food 'food which people eat when they are
unhappy', which in turn is more transparent than soul food 'food that is characteristic of
African-American culture in the United States'. The technical antonym for transparent is
opaque. See DAVID CRYSTAL, A DICTIONARY OF LINGUISTICS & PHONETICS 474 (5th ed.
2003),( defining the term "transparent" and contrasting it to "opaque").
2008] A LINGUISTIC LOOK AT TRADEMARK DILUTION 511
lexicographical methodology to compare, for example, the relative
frequency of occurrence in a LexisNexis search for instances of
Burger King, Apple, and Microsoft versus Kleenex, Xerox, and
Frisbee will yield a useful linguistic measure of relative "fame."
III. GENERICNESS ISSUES: VIABILITY OF "FAMOUS" MARKS
Historically in trademark litigation, expert linguistic opinion
about trademarks concerns itself in large part with two areas: strength
of mark and likelihood of confusion. 9 In my own consulting work, I
have researched perhaps two dozen marks with respect to linguistic
evidence relevant to the generic-descriptive-imaginative-arbitrary-
fanciful continuum-for example, Beanie and Beanie Baby (Ty Inc.'s
soft plush pellet-filled doll toys) and Screenie Beanie (Sofibelly's,
Inc.'s soft, plush, pellet-filled doll-like computer-screen wiping
devices); 10 steakburger (claimed as a common-law trademark by
Steak n Shake);1'1 kettle as a designator for a type of potato chip; 12
zinger as a spicy chicken menu item (claimed as a trademark by a
restaurant chain). 13
The word generic is a term of art in dictionary making as well as
the law, 14 and lexicographical methodology underlies the most
knowledgeable applications of linguistics to strength-of-mark
questions. When dictionary makers find, in the objective data of
everyday speech and published writing, widespread use of well-
known brand names in a fashion that has technical earmarks of
genericness, they may incorporate their findings in their dictionary
9. Linguists are sometimes also called upon to trace the history of a word or phrase
whose viability as a trademark has been challenged on historical grounds; for example, I carried
out such a study for the defendants' attorneys with respect to the phrase whisper quiet, used for
decades to describe the noise-free qualities of various machines (e.g., automobiles, refrigerators,
dishwashers, electric clothes driers). See Whirlpool Props., Inc., v. LG Elec., Inc., No. 1:03-cv-
414, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30311, *30-31 (W.D. Mi. Nov. 17, 2005). In addition, linguists
consult in cases concerning marks that had been challenged as socially unacceptable; see
discussion infra at notes 40-41.
10. Ty Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 2003).
11. Steak n Shake Co. v. Burger King Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 983, 985 (E.D. Mo. 2004).
12. Classic Foods Int'l Corp. v. Kettle Foods, Inc., 468 F.Supp.2d 1181 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
13. Complaint at 3, Ale House Mgmt., Inc. v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc., No. 5:02-CV-709-
BO(3) (E.D.N.C. 2002).
14. See SIDNEY 1. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 405
(2d ed. 2001) (defining trademark as "a symbol or name used by a maker of a product to
distinguish the product from others of its kind"). Landau distinguishes trademarks from generic
words, which are ordinary words "commonly used ... not for a brand of a kind of thing but for
the kind of the thing itself." Id. at 406.
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entries, generating definitions such as the following from The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language:
Band-Aid
A trademark used for an adhesive bandage with a gauze pad in the
center, employed to protect minor wounds. This trademark
sometimes occurs in print in figurative uses: "True welfare reform
is being bypassed for Band-Aid solutions" (Los Angeles Times).
"These measures are mere Band-Aids" (U.S. News & World
Report). 15
Frisbee
A trademark used for a plastic disk-shaped toy that players throw
and catch. This trademark sometimes occurs in print meaning "a
throw-and-catch game played with this toy": "The Mall is a better
place to play Frisbee with a dog" (Los Angeles Times).
16
Mace
A trademark used for an aerosol used to immobilize an attacker
temporarily. This trademark often occurs in print in uppercase or
lowercase as a verb and a noun: "shouted at police after he was
Maced when he rushed the fence" (David Shepardson, Detroit
News June 23, 1996).
17
Xerox
A trademark used for a photocopying process or machine
employing xerography. This trademark often occurs in print in
lowercase as a verb and noun: "Letters you send should be xeroxed
after you sign them" (Progressive Architecture). "He has four or
five sheets of foolscap, xeroxes, I see, of court documents" (Scott
Turow). 18
While not actually using the term generic to characterize these
marks, the American Heritage editors make use of well-known legal
earmarks of genericness in describing the cited usages, commenting
variously (1) that the marks sometimes appear in print in lower case,
(2) that they function as nouns and verbs,' 9 (3) that they are used
15. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 139 (4th ed.
2000) (underlining added).
16. Id. at 705 (underlining added).
17. Id. at 1047 (underlining added).
18. Id. at 1989 (underlining added).
19. In law, trademarks are often referred to as "adjectives" (a linguist would be more apt
to term them "noun adjuncts") since their full-phrase use is technically as modifiers of generic
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"figuratively," and even (4) (in the case of Frisbee) that they occur in
print with what appear to be, in effect, generic meanings. Clearly,
lexicographers understand the legal concept of genericness, but they
avoid explicitly labeling listed terms as "generic" so as to exempt
themselves from what might be construed as the drawing of legal
conclusions (thus avoiding the threat of legal action from the
trademark owners).2°
terms (e.g., Charmin toilet paper). See Gregory H. Guillot, A Guide to Proper Trademark Use,
http://www.ggmark.com/guide.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2008):
Marks are adjectives, and should be used only as such. Marks never should be
used as nouns or verbs. Nor should marks be pluralized, or used in the possessive
form. Non-adjectival uses of marks, over time, can result in genericness, or a
finding of unintentional abandonment -- even when such use emanates from the
public, rather than a trademark owner. For this reason, the owners of marks such
as Coke®, Kleenex®, Xerox®, and FedEx®, expend considerable efforts to educate
the public concerning the proper use of marks.
One way to ensure that a mark is used in proper adjectival context, is to follow
each use with the generic noun for the product identified. For example, generic
terms for the trademarked products and services mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, are "soft drink," "facial tissue," "photocopier," and "overnight courier
service."
Using these terms after the marks makes them adjectives rather than nouns.
Using the word "brand" after a mark, and before the generic product name,
further guards against non-adjectival use.
Id. Regardless of the advice of Guillot and others, trademarks frequently appear in print without
the accompanying generics, even in use by their trademark owners (e.g., Please don't squeeze
the Charmin!). Thus any such instance would appear to be of minor linguistic significance to the
mark's genericness status unless the instance also does not capitalize the mark. The use of a
mark as a verb, on the other hand, would appear to be far more robust linguistic evidence that
the user does not think of the term as a brand name but rather as a generic, even if (in this era of
automatic spell-checks) the user capitalizes the term (e.g., Please Xerox this letter for me!).
20. Indeed, many dictionaries publish disclaimers in their front matter that explicitly deny
that the definitions given therein constitute any legal claims about words, especially not about
the strength of any trademark. For example, the disclaimer of the New Oxford American
Dictionary reads as follows:
This book includes some words that are, or are asserted to be, proprietary names
or trademarks. Their inclusion does not imply that they have acquired for legal
purposes a nonproprietary or general significance, nor is any other judgment
implied concerning their legal status. In cases where the editors have some
evidence that a word is used as a proprietary name or trademark, this is indicated
by the designation TRADEMARK, but no judgment concerning the legal status of
such words is made or implied thereby.
NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY iv (2001). While I know of no case in which trademark
holders have brought suit against dictionary makers for any claims the dictionary makers may
have made with respect to the putative genericness of marks (and even if such legal action could
not possibly be successful), it is reported that dictionary publishers do frequently receive
complaint letters from the trademark holders' attorneys, letters that the lexicographers would
rather not have to explain to their in-house legal departments. See LANDAU, supra note 14, at
406-09.
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It is also an established principle of trademark law that a mark
will not be considered generic if the public in general-and potential
purchasers in particular-know and recognize it as a brand name, i.e.
if "the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming
public is not the product but the producer.",21 This holds true even if
consumers sometimes use the brand name figuratively or in shorthand
(i.e., synecdochical) reference to the type of goods or service that
each brand represents.2 2 It thus seems reasonable to conclude that
such extraordinarily famous brands as Band-Aid, Kleenex,23 and
Xerox, which (as the dictionaries report) sometimes exhibit in print
overt features of genericness, have not in fact undergone generiide-
assuming that the relevant public still recognizes them as brand
names. Such trademarks have recently been termed pseudogenerics.
24
Regardless of the special treatment of the features of genericness
in dictionaries, the lexicographical methodology generates data that
speak explicitly to strength-of-mark issues, and this is what the
linguistic expert draws upon in offering testimony bearing on
21. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118(1938).
22. See Butters and Westerhaus, supra note 4 (arguing that linguists (e.g., CLANKIE supra
note 4; SHUY, LINGUISTIC BATTLES, supra note 4, at 55) and lexicographers (LANDAU supra
note 14, at 406-09) have failed to take this important legal (and sociolinguistic) principle into
account when assuming that many famous brands should properly be labeled "generic").
23. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the American Heritage dictionary does not cite any
of the usual legal earmarks of genericness in its definition of any qualification of Kleenex,
writing simply that it is "A trademark used for a soft facial tissue." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 968 (4th ed. 2000) (1969).
24. Ronald R. Butters, Genericness in Lexicography, General Linguistics, and American
Trademark Law (July 2001) (unpublished conference presentation, Fifth Biennial Conference,
International Association of Forensic Linguists, University of Malta) (on file with author);
Jennifer Westerhaus and Ronald R. Butters, Trademark Genericide in Specialized Communities,
(July 2003) (unpublished conference presentation, Sixth Biennial Conference, International
Association of Forensic Linguists, University of Sydney, Australia) (on file with author);
Ronald R. Butters, Linguistic Issues in American Trademark Law, (Sept. 2006) (unpublished
presentation, Sixth International Summer School in Forensic Linguistic Analysis, Birmingham,
England) (on file with author). The term genericide is sometimes used to describe situations in
which, usually because of frequent shorthand and figurative use, consumers actually have lost
all meaningful mental connection between the mark and the company that has been the source of
origin of the product. Many trademarks were declared to have become generic in this way in
earlier days-for example, aspirin, cellophane, and shredded wheat. See, e.g., Bayer Co. v.
United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 514-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods.
Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1936); Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938).
Because of modem advertising and marketing techniques, as well as vigilant legal policing by
trademark holders, genericide appears to be somewhat rare today, though such terms as murphy
bed and trampoline were in relatively recent times declared to have lost their status as
trademarks. See, e.g., Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 100-01 (2d
Cir. 1989); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Am. Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745, 749 (S.D. Iowa
1961).
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strength-of-mark questions, particularly in cases where genericness is
at issue.
In cases in which the plaintiff asserts dilution, the use of such
linguistic expertise about the strength of marks will arise, at least
occasionally. Because marks about which the trademark holders can
assert dilution claims must by definition be "famous, 25 even
descriptive marks in such cases would presumably have secondary
meaning (or they would not be "famous"). Thus the issue of strength
of mark arises in dilution cases only if the defendant claims that the
plaintiffs mark is generic.
It seems likely that in some instances of famous marks, a
genericness defense would be plausible (if sometimes meretricious).
That is, if a putatively diluted mark is generic, and hence not a
legitimate mark at all, then it could scarcely be defended, regardless
of how "famous" it might be.26 In Ty Inc. v. Sofibelly, in which Ty
complained that Softbelly was diluting its Beanie mark, the defendant
makers of Screenie Beanies did in fact assert just that-that Beanie
had undergone genericide. 27 Our analysis, conducted following
lexicographical methodology, was based upon both a LexisNexis
search and an online search using the Google search engine. We
concluded that Beanie was not generic (and submitted our findings to
the court, and presented them to the jury in testimony): unlike what
lexicographers found for even such pseudogenerics as Band-Aid,
Frisbee, Mace, Xerox, or Kleenex, standard written sources contain
very few uses of Beanie and Beanie Baby that meet any of the
standard legal criteria for genericness (e.g., lower-case representation,
figurative usage, use in general reference, and use as a verb).
If dilution litigation continues to increase, the genericness
defense will no doubt come forth again and again-whenever the
defendant feels that it is a legitimate counter to the dilution claim. If
so, then there will be cause to call upon linguists in such dilution
cases.
25. 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(c)(1) (West Supp. 2007)
26. The discussion here in some ways parallels Shuy's discussionof the "origins" of
dilution: "attorneys would be prudent to find out who caused the dilution and when it started...
.The senior owners of famous marks can create dilution all by themselves." Shuy, Linguistics
and Trademark Dilution, supra note 2, at 5.
27. Ty Inc. v. Softbelly's, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 530-36 (7th Cir. 2003).
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IV. BLURRING AND SIMILARITY OF THE MARKS
The other subject about which linguists frequently give expert
testimony in trademark cases involves evidence bearing on the issue
of likelihood of confusion. I have been a consultant in a number of
cases involving alleged likelihood of confusion of two marks (e.g.,
between CarMax and AutoNationUSA 28 and between Aventis and
Advancis). 29 In most of these cases, dilution was not part of the
plaintiffs complaint, and to my knowledge the linguistic evidence
was not ever brought to bear on the dilution complaint.
Even though "likelihood of confusion" as such is explicitly ruled
out by statute as a determining factor in dilution litigation, a question
nevertheless does arise as to just how similar two marks must be to
trigger "tarnishment" and/or "blurring. 3 ° Obviously, if the two marks
are identical, as in, say, Delta (faucets) and Delta (airlines), then there
is little that a linguist (or anyone else) can say about the likelihood
that one mark might remind the members of the public of the other
based strictly on phonological, morphological, and semantic
grounds.3' On the other hand, when two marks are NOT absolutely
identical, significant questions may arise. In the case of Victoria's
Secret and Victor's Little Secret, the courts were at least willing to
entertain the notion that the linguistic similarity of the two could
trigger significant blurring and tarnishment-significant enough to be
of detriment to the senior mark.32 Thus analysis of the kinds and
amounts of phonological, morphological, and semantic similarity of
two contesting marks could conceivably be of use in such cases.
In at least one case in which the issue of dilution was part of the
complaint, linguistic-issue testimony concerning the similarities and
differences of the two marks at issue appears to have been influential.
In one well-known case the plaintiff's mark, Lexis, was already in use
28. AutoNation, Inc. v. Acme Commercial Corp., No. 98-5848 (S.D. Fla., Dec. 9, 1999).
The marks in this case were CarMax's Automation and AutoNation, Inc.'s, AutoNation USA.
29. Sanofi-Aventis v. Advancis Pharm. Corp., 453 F.Supp. 2d 834 (D. Del. 2006).
30. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c).
31. However, forms of sociolinguistic analysis-pragmatics, discourse analysis, and
semiotics-could prove useful in approaching such questions as trade dress, advertising, and
market overlap. As Roger Shuy notes, "Context is very important in accusations of dilution.
Words in isolation seldom occur in our lives, except in spelling bees and grocery lists"; "Is there
any reason to believe that the human mind would have difficulty keeping straight several
different products ... in their distinct and unique linguistic and commercial contexts?" SHUY,
LINGUISTIC BATTLES, supra note 4, at 7, 8.
32. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 423-35 (2003). Linguists
apparently did not examine these issues, and the linguistic basis for the court's judgment is not
clear.
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for an information-processing web site, and the defendant intended to
use the mark Lexus for luxury automobiles.33 The case was decided in
favor of the defendant, at least in some part because of supposed
major differences in pronunciation between the words Lexis and
Lexus. The alleged crucial difference was asserted in the testimony of
a professor of medieval literature from the Columbia University
English Department, which was quoted as follows in the majority
opinion:
[A]nyone can pronounce "lexis" and "lexus" the same, either both
with an unstressed I or both with an unstressed U, or schwa-or
with some sound in between. But, properly, the distinction between
unstressed I and unstressed U, or schwa, is a standard one in
English; the distinction is there to be made in ordinary, reasonably
careful speech.
34
Unfortunately, the professor's testimony runs contrary to the
linguistic reality: for most Americans, the pronunciations of Lexus
and Lexis are so close as to be virtually indistinguishable, and for
many they are in fact identical; not only is it neither "standard" or
inherently "proper" to distinguish "unstressed I" and "unstressed U,"
the two are normally interchangeable variants, and attempts at
distinguishing them in uttering the two marks will sound highly
artificial and unnatural. Still, right or wrong, Mead presents an
instance in which testimony, admitted as "expert," about the linguistic
phonological differences between two marks at least marginally
affected the decision in a dilution case-and was considered
important enough to be quoted in the majority opinion.
In a second case,35 decided in favor of the plaintiff on trademark
infringement grounds shortly before the passage of the Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA), Judge Sue L. Robinson found
in addition that there was a likelihood of dilution under Delaware
law-though she found no demonstrable actual dilution, which the
United States Supreme Court had ruled in Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc. was necessary under the pre-revision version of the
federal dilution laws.36 In her published opinion, Judge Robinson
incorporated elements of my expert linguistic testimony on behalf of
the plaintiff concerning "degree of similarity of the two marks"
33. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir.
1989). I was not a consultant in this case.
34. Id. at 1029-30.
35. Sanofi-Aventis v. Advancis Pharm. Corp., 453 F.Supp. 2d 834 (D.Del. 2006).
36. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.
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Aventis and Advancis. 7 Judge Robinson was persuaded by the
plaintiff's arguments that the two marks were confusingly similar, and
this view in turn formed a fundamental basis for her decision in favor
of the plaintiff.38 Moreover, the view that Aventis and Advancis are
confusingly similar in sound and meaning appears to have been
instrumental in her conclusion concerning "likelihood of dilution"
under Delaware trademark law:
In order to prevail on a claim brought pursuant to the [Delaware
Trademark Act], a plaintiff must demonstrate that there is a
likelihood of dilution, not actual dilution. Likelihood of dilution
requires "some mental association between the marks" and can be
defined as a "blurring of a mark's product identification or the
tamishment of the affirmative associations a mark has come to
convey." Barnes Group, 793 F. Supp. at 1304.
As discussed above, the court concludes that a likelihood of
some mental association between the marks exists based upon the
testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses. Accordingly, the court
concludes that defendant's mark causes dilution pursuant to the
DTA.
39
In light of the 2006 revision to federal trademark law, Judge
Robinson's opinion would surely extend now to federal trademark
law as well.
V. CONCLUSION
The considerable experience that linguists have had in thinking
about trademarks can, I believe, be brought to bear in dilution cases in
the ways that I have discussed here:
1. Providing evidence for the determination of one dimension of
fame.
2. Providing evidence with respect to the validity of the mark where
genericness issues are raised by the defendants.
3. Determining the likelihood of blurring and tarnishment with
respect to the phonological, morphological, and semantic
characteristics of the mark.
These are rather conservative goals. One might well also
consider whether linguistics can shed light on the nature of
37. Judge Robinson also noted that the linguistic testimony of the defendant's linguistics
analyst (who was the same Columbia University medievalist who testified for the defendants in
Mead) supported the plaintiff's case. Sanofi-Aventis, 453 F.Supp. at 848-49.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 855 (emphasis added).
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tarnishment. Linguistic expertise has sometimes been brought to bear
upon questions of legal defamation; 40 linguists have also testified
about whether trademarks violate federal trademark law forbidding
"immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may
disparage.",41 The methodology in such cases might also be brought to
bear upon the determination of tarnishment. Time will tell if clever
attorneys will find ways of making use of the expert testimony of
bone fide linguists in taking on this issue.
40. See Peter Meijes Tiersma, The Language of Defamation, 66 TEX. L. REV. 303 (1987);
HANNES KNIFFKA, WORKING IN LANGUAGE AND LAW 113 (2007).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000). See, e.g., DYKES ON BIKES, U.S. Trademark Serial No.
78/281746 (filed July 31, 2003), Office Action from Sharon A. Meier, Trademark Attorney
(Feb. 20, 2004) (denying the application initially, but finally allowing it after the applicant filed
an appeal supported by my affidavit and that of numerous social scientists, including linguists
and lexicographers). In another case that began in the late 1990s, the USPTO denied renewal of
the trademark Redskins (use for generations as the professional name for the Washington, DC,
football team) on grounds that the mark was disparaging and therefore in conflict with the
explicit prohibition of federal trademark law. The lexicographer David K. Barnhart and I
testified on behalf of Pro-Football, Inc. The linguist Geoffrey Nunberg testified on behalf of
Harjo et al. The decision to deny renewal was overturned in 2003 by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F.Supp. 2d 96, 107-09
(D.D.C. 2003), reh'g denied, No. 03-7162, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19603 (D.D.C. 2005) (per
curiam).
* * *
